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Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Harmelin v. Michigan,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of pa-
role for a conviction of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine,
without any consideration of mitigating factors, 2 did not violate the
Eighth Amendment's3 prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. This Note examines the Harmelin opinions and concludes
that although the Court's opinions fail to provide uniform guidance
regarding the scope of the Eighth Amendment and the status of past
Supreme Court decisions, the majority correctly concluded that the
Eighth Amendment does not require consideration of mitigating
factors in this case and that Harmelin's sentence of life in prison
without possibility of parole was not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
This Note contends that Justice Scalia incorrectly argued that
the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. This
Note argues that Justice Kennedy's concurrence correctly followed
precedent by continuing to recognize a narrow proportionality re-
quirement in the Eighth Amendment. This Note also argues that
the concurrence's modification of Solem's three factor proportional-
ity analysis was inappropriate. The dissent, on the other hand, cor-
rectly argued that the Solem second and third factors are important
to an analysis of a punishment's proportionality. Finally, any pro-
portionality analysis should also include a fourth factor which re-
I I1I S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
2 In Harmelin's case, the main mitigating factor was the fact that Harmelin had no
prior felony convictions. Id. at 2701.
3 The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor




quires courts to consider local conditions and the legislative goals
sought to be achieved by the punishment.
II. BACKGROUND
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits federal and state governments from imposing cruel and unu-
sual punishments for crimes. 4 Judicial interpretation of this
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment covers three ar-
eas.5 First, the Eighth Amendment restricts methods and modes of
punishment. Second, it limits the amount of punishment which can
be imposed for certain offenses. Finally, the Eighth Amendment
bars any punishment in certain circumstances. 6
The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ments originated from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688. 7
The provision was adopted as part of the American Bill of Rights in
1791.8 At that time, the provision banned modes of punishments
such as pillorying, disemboweling, decapitation, drawing and quar-
tering,9 burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, the
rack and thumbscrew, and extreme instances of solitary confine-
ment.' 0 Although these specific punishments are uncommon today,
the Eighth Amendment's relevance continues because the amend-
ment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'" The
Supreme Court has not confined the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against certain methods and modes of punishment to methods
that were banned in the eighteenth century. 12
Instead, the Eighth Amendment is both a flexible and dynamic
concept. 13 For example, the Supreme Court has held that depriva-
tion of citizenship as punishment for desertion from the United
States Army in wartime is cruel and unusual.1 4 While inflicting no
physical pain, the punishment totally destroys "the individual's sta-
4 See supra note 3.
5 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &A . SCOTr,JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.14(f) at 177 (2d ed. 1986).
6 Id.
7 Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79
HARV. L. REV. 635, 636 (1966).
8 Id. at 637.
9 Id.
10 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 177.
11 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
12 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976).
13 Id. "[Tihe clause forbidding "cruel and unusual" punishments 'is not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a hu-
mane justice.'" Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
14 Trop, 356 U.S. at 103-04.
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tus in organized society." 15 In Jackson v. Bishop, the Eighth Circuit
held that a modem mode of punishment, the use of the strap in
Arkansas prisons, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. 16
The Supreme Court has held that the death penalty as a
method of punishment is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.17 Six years later, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Court concluded
that it is unconstitutional for a sentencing judge to disregard rele-
vant mitigating factors in capital cases.1 8
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment also bars excessive punishment. 19 Weems v. United States
is the leading case on whether excessive punishment, out of propor-
tion to the offense committed, is unconstitutional. 20 In Weems, a
public official in the Philippines convicted of falsifying a public and
official document received a punishment of fifteen years of cadena
temporal.2 1 The punishment of cadena temporal included hard and
painful labor, constant enchainment, deprivation of parental author-
ity, loss of the right to dispose of property inter vivos, and constant
surveillance for life.22 The Court held the punishment unconstitu-
tional on two grounds. The Court viewed the peculiar mode of pun-
ishment as inherently cruel and unusual in American jurisdictions.23
The Court also concluded that the punishment of cadena temporal was
excessive in relation to the crime of falsifying a public document.24
In Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the death pen-
alty for the crime of rape was unconstitutional. 25 "Death is indeed a
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman."26
Coker was the first modem Supreme Court decision to invalidate a
punishment under the Eighth Amendment on the basis of
disproportionality. 27
15 Id. at 101.
16 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 581 (8th Cir. 1968).
17 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (imposition of death penalty for crime of murder does not,
under all circumstances, violate the Eighth Amendment).
18 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1982) (death sentence for murder
conviction unconstitutional where state court refused to consider petitioner's unhappy
family history including severe emotional disturbance and beatings by a harsh father as
mitigating evidence).
19 LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 5, at 179.
20 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
21 Id. at 357-58.
22 Id. at 364.
23 Id. at 377.
24 Id.
25 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1976).
26 Id. at 597.
27 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 180 (quoting Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death:
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The Supreme Court in So/em v. Helm extended the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality guarantee to felony prison
sentences. 28 The Solem Court set aside as disproportionate a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a convic-
tion under a South Dakota recividist statute for seven successive
offenses that included three convictions of third-degree burglary,
one of obtaining money by false pretenses, one of grand larceny,
one of third offense driving while intoxicated, and one of writing a
"no account" check with intent to defraud. 29
Last, the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment bars punishment of any kind in certain situations.30
The Eighth Amendment restricts what conduct legislatures can de-
fine as criminal. 3 ' In Robinson v. California, Robinson was sentenced
to ninety days in prison upon being convicted of violating a Califor-
nia statute which made it a criminal offense for a person to be ad-
dicted to the use of narcotics.3 2 The Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the California statute criminalizing an addiction to
narcotics. 33 The Court stated that to punish someone for the "sta-
tus" of narcotic addiction without proof of purchase, sale, or posses-
sion of narcotics is cruel and unusual punishment.34
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the early morning hours of May 12, 1986, two police officers
stopped Ronald Allen Harmelin for failure to make a complete stop
at a red light.35 Harmelin, who remained seated in his car, complied
in a cooperative manner when asked to produce a driver's license
and vehicle registration. 36 Harmelin then stepped out of his car.37
After getting out of his car, Harmelin voluntarily informed one
of the officers that he was carrying a pistol in an ankle holster.38
Harmelin then handed the officer a general permit to carry a con-
Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. PA. L .REV. 989, 990
(1978)).
28 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
29 Id. at 279-81.
30 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 182.
31 Id.
32 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 663 (1962).
33 Id. at 667.
34 Id. at 666. Similarly, to impose a punishment of one day in prison for the crime of
having a common cold would be cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 667.
35 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Harmelin v. Michigan, III S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-
7272) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
36 People v. Harmelin, 176 Mich. App. 524, 528, 440 N.W.2d 75, 77 (1989).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 529, 440 N.W.2d at 77.
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cealed weapon and a safety inspection certificate for the .38 caliber
which was later found in Harmelin's ankle holster.39
A search of Harmelin's person led to the discovery of some ma-
rijuana, and the officers placed Harmelin under arrest.40 In search-
ing Harmelin after his arrest, the officers found assorted pills and
capsules, three vials of white powder, ten baggies of white powder,
drug paraphernalia and a telephone beeper.4 1 Later, the police im-
pounded Harmelin's car and a search of the trunk revealed a travel
bag containing a shaving-kit bag.42 The kit contained $2900 in cash
and two bags of white powder subsequently determined to be 672.5
grams of cocaine. 43 Harmelin's fingerprints were found on books
inside the travel bag and next to the bags of cocaine. 44
At trial, Harmelin neither testified in his own behalf nor
presented any witnesses. 45 Ajury convicted Harmelin of possessing
672 grams of cocaine, and the judge sentenced him to a mandatory
term of life in prison without parole.46 Even though Harmelin had
no prior felony convictions, 47 Michigan law48 dictated a mandatory
sentence of life in prison without parole.49
The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed Harmelin's
conviction because the supporting evidence had been obtained in








46 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1991).
47 Id. at 2701.
48 Michigan Compiled Laws Section 333.7403(2)(a)(i) provides a mandatory sen-
tence of life in prison for possession of 650 grams or more of any mixture containing a
schedule I or 2 controlled substance. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i)
(West Supp. 1991). Section 333.7214(a)(iv) defines cocaine as a schedule 2 controlled
substance. MICn. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7214(a)(iv) (West Supp. 1991). Section
791.234(4) provides eligibility for parole after ten years in prison, except for those con-
victed of either first-degree murder or "a major controlled substance offense." MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 791.234(4) (West Supp. 1991). Section 791.233b(l)(b) defines
"major controlled substance offense" as including a violation of § 333.7403. MICH.
CoMp. LAws ANN. § 791.233b(l)(b) (West Supp. 1991).
49 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684.
50 People v. Harmelin, 176 Mich.App. 524, 526-27, 440 N.W. 75, 76 (1989). The
Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed Harmelin's conviction after considering the
issue of the propriety of a police officer commanding a driver out of his car after having
stopped the driver for a traffic violation. Id. Under the federal constitution, a police
officer ordering a driver to get out of his car after the car has been lawfully stopped for a
traffic violation, even though the officer had no reason to suspect foul play at the time,
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Two of the three judges of the Michigan Court
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the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision and af-
firmed Harmelin's conviction and sentence. 5' The Court of Appeals
rejected Harmelin's argument that his sentence of life in prison
without possibility of parole was "cruel and unusual" under the
Eighth Amendment. 52 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave
to appeal,53 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether a mandatory term of life in prison for possess-
ing over 650 grams of cocaine constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. 54
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, 55 Justice Scalia announced the judg-
ment of the Court that Harmelin's mandatory sentence of life in
prison without possibility of parole without consideration of mitigat-
ing factors, such as the fact that Harmelin had no prior felony con-
victions, did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 56 The majority
rejected Harmelin's "required mitigation" argument that a sen-
tencer may not impose such a severe sentence as life in prison with-
out parole before hearing mitigating and aggravating factors. 57
Harmelin argued that death penalty jurisprudence required the
consideration of mitigating factors in his case. The Supreme Court
has held that imposition of a capital sentence without an individual-
ized determination that the punishment is appropriate constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 58
of Appeals held that the Michigan Constitution's search and seizure provision provided
greater protection in this situation than the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. Id.
51 Id. On reconsideration, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided that under the
circumstances in this case, the Michigan Constitution's search and seizure provision did




54 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
55 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter joined this
portion ofJustice Scalia's opinion.
56 Harmelin v. Michigan, II1 S. Ct. 2680, 2701-02 (1991).
57 Id. at 2701.
58 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (North Carolina's
mandatory death sentence for first degree murder without consideration of the charac-
ter and record of each offender or the circumstances of a particular offense unconstitu-
tional); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (holding unconstitutional Ohio's
death penalty statute which required a trial judge, once a verdict of aggravated murder
with specifications returned, to impose death sentence unless one or more specified mit-
igating factors was present. The statute, however, did not allow the sentencing judge to
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Harmelin argued that the Court should extend the "individualized
capital-sentencing doctrine" to an "individualized mandatory life in
prison without parole sentencing doctrine." 59 In other words,
Harmelin contended that a sentencing court should be required to
consider aggravating and mitigating factors before it can impose
such a severe sentence as life imprisonment without possibility of
parole. In his case, Harmelin contended that the Michigan sentenc-
ing judge should have been required to consider the fact that
Harmelin had no prior felony convictions before sentencing Harme-
lin to life in prison without possibility of parole.60
The Court refused to extend individualized sentencing in capi-
tal cases to noncapital cases because of the qualitative difference be-
tween death sentences and all other forms of punishment. 61 Its
total irrevocability and rejection of rehabilitation makes the death
penalty unique. 62 The majority concluded that although Harmelin's
sentence was the second most severe known to the law, 63 the pos-
sibilities of retroactive legislation and executive clemency were still
available to reduce his sentence.64
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
Justice Scalia 65 concluded that the Eighth Amendment does not
contain a proportionality guarantee. Rejecting Harmelin's argu-
ment that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to
the crime committed,66 Justice Scalia began by examining recent
consider defendant's lack of specific intent to cause death and defendant's role as ac-
complice as mitigating evidence); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (see
supra note 18); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987) (holding sentence of
death unconstitutional when trial judge instructed advisory jury not to consider nonstat-
utory mitigating circumstances and he himself refused to consider nonstatutory mitigat-
ing circumstances).
59 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702.
60 Id. at 2701.
61 Id. (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605) ("The nonavailability of corrective or modifying
mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for indi-
vidualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sen-
tence"); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 ("[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from
a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two");
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1983) ("This theme, the unique nature of the
death penalty for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, has been repeated time and
time again in our opinions").
62 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. 2702 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2760
(1972)).
63 The most severe penalty being the death penalty.
64 Harmelin, I11 S. Ct. at 2702.
65 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined this portion ofJustice Scalia's opinion.
66 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2684 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
1992]
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Supreme Court Eighth Amendment decisions. 67 Justice Scalia rec-
ognized that the Court in Rummel v. Estelle68 rejected the dissent's
argument that a punishment's disproportionality could be estab-
lished by weighing three factors 69: 1) the gravity of the offense com-
pared to the severity of the penalty, 2) the comparability to penalties
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and 3) the com-
parability to penalties imposed in other jurisdictions for the same
offense. 70 In Hutto v. Davis,71 the Supreme Court again rejected an
application of the three factors discussed in the Rummel dissent.72
However, in Solem v. Helm73, the Supreme Court stated that a
general principle of proportionality exists and applied the three-fac-
tor test.74 Justice Scalia recognized that the three-factor test had
been explicitly rejected in both Rummel and Hutto.75 Justice Scalia,
therefore, concluded "that Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee." 76
Justice Scalia criticized Solem's proposition that a right to be free
from disproportionate punishments was embodied within the "cruel
and unusual punishments" provision of the English Declaration of
Rights of 1689 and then incorporated with that same language into
the Eighth Amendment.77 Justice Scalia argued that the principle of
proportionality was familiar to English law at the time the Declara-
tion of Rights was drafted, and despite this familiarity, the drafters
did not explicitly prohibit disproportionate or excessive punish-
67 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
68 In Rummel, the Supreme Court held that imposition of a life sentence, under a
recidivist statute, upon a defendant who had been convicted, successively, of fraudulent
use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services, passing a forged check in
the amount of $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285.
69 Harmelin, 111 S.Ct. at 2684 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
70 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71 In Hutto, the Supreme Court held that a prison term of forty years and a fine of
$20,000 for possession and distribution of approximately nine ounces of marijuana did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375.
72 Id. at 373.
73 In Solem, the Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole imposed under a South Dakota recividist statute for successive of-
fenses that included three convictions of third-degree burglary, one conviction of ob-
taining money by false pretenses, one conviction of grand larceny, one conviction of
third-offense driving while intoxicated, and one conviction of writing a "no a account"
check with intent to defraud violated the Eighth Amendment because the sentence was
disproportionate to the crime of recidivism. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
74 Id. at 290-92.
75 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 373; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1980).
76 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
77 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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ments. 78 Instead, the drafters prohibited "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishments. Justice Scalia argued that the Solem Court incorrectly
assumed that one included the other.79 Justice Scalia used a histori-
cal analysis8° to support his argument that the English Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause was probably not meant to forbid
"disproportionate" punishments. 8' Instead, Justice Scalia con-
cluded the "unusual" requirement prohibited punishments contrary
to "usage" or "precedent. ' 's2
Justice Scalia argued that the word "unusual" does not mean
"contrary to law" today, but instead means "such as does not occur
in ordinary practice."8 3 The "cruel and unusual" punishments
clause forbids the legislatures from authorizing particular forms or
modes of punishment, specifically punishments that are not regu-
larly employed.8 4 Justice Scalia continued his historical analysis by
examining several state constitutions, the state ratifying conven-
tions, and early judicial constructions of the Eighth Amendment and
its state counterpart to confirm his argument that the cruel and unu-
sual punishments clause prohibits certain methods of punishment.8 5
Justice Scalia criticized the three factors that the Solem Court
found relevant to the proportionality determination because these
78 Id. at 2687 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
79 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
80 Id. at 2687-91 (opinion of Scalia,J.). Justice Scalia argued that the abuses of Lord
ChiefJusticeJeffreys of the King's Bench during the Stuart reign ofJames II inspired the
cruel and unusual punishments provision of the English Declaration of Rights. Id. at
2687. Jeffreys allegedly created penalties which were not authorized by common-law
precedent or statute. Id. at 2688. Justice Scalia contended that the English cruel and
unusual punishments clause focused on the illegality rather than disproportionality of
Jeffreys' King's Bench activities. Id. Justice Scalia asserted that at that time, "illegal"
and "unusual" were identical. Id. at 2690. Punishments were objectionable because
they were contrary to law or precedent but not because punishments were dispropor-
tionate to the crime committed. Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
81 Id. at 2691 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
82 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
83 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
84 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
85 Id. at 2692-96 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Several state constitutions explicitly con-
tained proportionality guarantee provisions. Id. at 2692. For example, the Pennsylvania
Constitution stated that punishments should be "in general more proportionate to the
crimes." Pa. Const., Sec. 38 (1776). The New Hampshire Bill of Rights declared that
"all penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence." N.H. Bill of
Rights, Pt. 1, Art. XVIII (1784). Therefore, Justice Scalia argued that those men who
framed and ratified the American Bill of Rights were aware of these state constitution
provisions and purposely chose not to include a similar provision in the American Bill of
Rights. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2692 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Justice Scalia cited early
judicial cases in which judges found the proportionality of punishments irrelevant and
instead, focused on modes of punishment. Id. at 2695 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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factors invite imposition of judges' subjective values.8 6 As to the
first factor, the inherent gravity of drug possession depends on how
one views the social threat posed by drug use. Justice Scalia argued
that the Michigan Legislature should decide this and not judges un-
familiar with the drug situation on the streets of Detroit.87 The sec-
ond factor, the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the
same jurisdiction, also fails because judges will decide what they
consider comparable.8 8 The third factor, the sentences imposed for
the same crime in other jurisdictions, is irrelevant to the Eighth
Amendment. 89 As a result of our federalist system, one state will
often treat particular offenders more severely than other states be-
cause states have different needs and concerns. 90
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that although twentieth century
Supreme Court cases have not always followed the proposition that
the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality requirement,
these cases have not departed from that proposition to the extent
suggested by Solem. 9 1 Scalia attempted to minimize the holdings of
Weems v. United States92 and Coker v. Georgia98 which both apply a re-
quirement of proportionality to criminal penalties.
86 Id. at 2697 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
87 Id. at 2698 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
88 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
89 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
90 Id. at 2699 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
91 Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
92 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems, a government disbursing officer convicted of mak-
ing false entries of small sums in his account book was sentenced by a Philippine court to
fifteen years of cadena temporal. Id. at 357-58. The punishment called for incarceration at
"hard and painful labor" with chains fastened to the wrists and ankles at all times.
There were also accessory penalties imposed which included permanent disqualification
from holding any position of public trust, subjection to government surveillance for life
and "civil interdiction" which among others consisted of deprivation of the rights of
parental authority and guardianship of person or property. Id. at 364. The Supreme
Court held that the imposition of cadena temporal was cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
at 382.
Justice Scalia admitted that the language of Weems could be interpreted to support
either the principle that the Eighth Amendment forbids barbaric modes of punishments
or the principle that the Eighth Amendment bars those punishments that are excessive
in relation to the crime committed. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2700 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
Justice Scalia argued that Weems probably did not announce a constitutional proportion-
ality guarantee because neither the Supreme Court nor lower federal courts produced
any decisions using a proportionality requirement for six decades after the Weems deci-
sion. Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
93 433 U.S. 584 (1976). In Coker, the Court held that imposition of capital punish-
ment for rape of an adult woman is grossly disproportionate and constituted a violation
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Id. at 600. Justice Scalia minimized this
holding by arguing that Coker is part of the Supreme Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence and not a generalized aspect of Eighth Amendment law. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at
2701. "Death is different." Id. (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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C. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy94 filed an opinion concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment. Although agreeing that the Eighth
Amendment does not require the consideration of mitigating factors
in noncapital cases, Justice Kennedy's Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality analysis differed from Justice Scalia's. Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that regardless of historical arguments, stare decisis required
adherence to the narrow proportionality principle that exists in the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.95 The concurrence ad-
mitted that past proportionality decisions were not clear or consis-
tent but concluded that past decisions could be reconciled. 96
Justice Kennedy began by stating that past decisions recognize
a narrow proportionality principle embodied in the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Kennedy
examined past decisions and offered several common principles that
explain the uses and limits of the proportionality analyses. 97
First, the fixing of prison terms for specific crimes is "properly
within the province of legislatures, not courts."98 Second, the
Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one peno-
logical theory.99 Third, a federalist system inevitably results in dif-
ferent theories on sentencing and the proper length of prescribed
prison terms.10 0 Finally, to the maximum extent possible, objective
factors should guide proportionality reviews.' 0 ' Justice Kennedy
concluded that these principles suggest that the Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sen-
tence.1 0 2 Instead, Justice Kennedy argued the Eighth Amendment
prohibits only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportion-
ate" to the crime.' 0 3
Justice Kennedy distinguished Hamelin's facts from Solem's facts
and concluded that Harmelin's crime was much more serious than
Solem's crimes. 10 4 Justice Kennedy concluded that the Michigan
Legislature could with reason decide that the threat posed to society
94 Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter.
95 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97 Id. at 2703-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 2703 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-276 (1980)) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
99 Id. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
100 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
101 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
104 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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and the individual by possession of a large amount of cocaine war-
ranted a life sentence without parole. 10 5 The severity of Harmelin's
crime brings his sentence within Eighth Amendment boundaries es-
tablished by prior decisions. 10 6
The concurrence stated that after analyzing the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty, the reviewing court does
not need to address the second and third factors announced in So-
/em.107 "Intra- and inter-jurisdictional analyses are appropriate only
in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime com-
mitted and the sentence imposed lead to an inference of gross
disproportionality." 10 8
D. JUSTICE WHITE'S DISSENTING OPINION
Writing in dissent'0 9, Justice White attacked Justice Scalia's ar-
gument that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportion-
ality guarantee.°10 White contended that undeniably prior Supreme
Court cases have interpreted the Eighth Amendment to embody a
proportionality requirement."'I Justice White argued that contrary
to Justice Scalia's suggestion, the Solem analysis has worked well in
practice.1 2 Since the Solem decision, only four cases have been re-
versed on the basis of a proportionality analysis. 113 Therefore,
White concluded that reviewing courts are not substituting their
subjective views for those of the legislature. 114
Justice White found two dangers in Justice Scalia's analysis. 1 5
First, Justice Scalia provided no mechanism for dealing with a situa-
tion like the one suggested in Rummel where a legislature makes
overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.' 16 In-
stead, Justice Scalia merely assured that these extreme examples will
never occur. 117 Next, Justice White argued that Justice Scalia's posi-
105 Id. at 2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
109 Justice White was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
110 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2709-14 (White, J., dissenting).
tll Id. at 2711 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1976); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
112 Id. at 2712-13 (White, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 2713 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 2713 (White, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 2714 (White, J., dissenting).
116 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
117 Id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated, "[O]ne can imagine extreme ex-
966 [Vol. 82
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
tion that Eighth Amendment only deals with methods and modes of
punishment is inconsistent with the Court's capital decisions.118
These cases do not outlaw death as a mode of punishment but put
limits on its application.11 9
Justice White also argued that Justice Kennedy's analysis con-
tradicts the language of the Solem opinion and other cases interpret-
ing the Eighth Amendment. 20 Justice White objected to Justice
Kennedy's argument that one of the Solem factors may be sufficient
to determine the constitutionality of a sentence.' 21 The Court in
Solem stated, "no one factor will be dispositive in a given case," and
"no single criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly dis-
proportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment."1 22
Justice White proceeded to apply the Solem factors to Harme-
lin's case and decided that the statutorily mandated sentence vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. 23 The first factor requires an
assessment of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty.' 24 Michigan has no death penalty, and therefore, life im-
prisonment without parole is the most severe punishment in the
state.' 25 Justice White concluded that the possession of over 650
grams of cocaine does not always warrant that severe punish-
ment. 126 Under the second factor of the Solem analysis, Justice
White concluded that Harmelin was treated in the same manner or
more severely than persons who have committed more serious
crimes.1 27 The third factor requires an analysis of the sentences im-
posed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.' 28 Justice White
noted that no other jurisdiction imposes a punishment as severe as
Michigan's for possessing over 650 grams of cocaine.' 29
amples that no rational person, in no time or place, could accept. But for the same
reason these examples are easy to decide, they are certain never to occur." Id. at 2696-
97 (footnote omitted) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
118 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
121 Id. (White, J, dissenting).
122 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 n.17 (1983).
123 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716-19 (White, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2716. (White, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2718. (WhiteJ., dissenting). In Michigan, second-degree murder, rape, and
armed robbery are not punished with as harsh mandatory sentences as Harmelin's pos-
session of 650 grams or more of cocaine, although judicial discretion can impose a life
sentence for those three crimes. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 2719 (White, J., dissenting).
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E. JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall agreed with Justice White's dissenting opinion
except with its assertion that the Eighth Amendment does not pro-
scribe the death penalty. 130 Justice Marshall argued that in all cir-
cumstances the constitution prohibits the death penalty.' 3 '
F. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens 132 also agreed with White's dissenting opinion
but added that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possi-
bility of parole was similar to the death penalty in that the offender
will never regain freedom.13 3 No other jurisdiction except Michigan
has rejected reform and rehabilitation for this offense.' 3 4 Although
Harmelin's offense was serious, the Michigan legislature rationally
could not have decided that every similar offender is
uncorrectable. 3 5
V. ANALYSIS
Although a majority of the justices failed to join any one opin-
ion, a majority of the Court correctly decided that the Eighth
Amendment did not require consideration of mitigating factors in
Harmelin's case and that Harmelin's sentence of life in prison for
possessing over 650 grams of cocaine was constitutional. Prior
Supreme Court decisions fail to support Justice Scalia's assertion
that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality re-
quirement. Justice Kennedy's concurrence inappropriately modi-
fied the Solem three factor test. The Solem second and third factors,
which the concurrence argued are unnecessary to determine the
constitutionality of a punishment, are relevant to any proportional-
ity analysis. Also, proportionality analyses should include a fourth
factor requiring courts to consider local conditions, the legislative
goals sought to be achieved by the punishment, and whether the
legislative goals are rationally related to the punishment.
130 Id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
132 Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Blackmun.
133 Harmelin, Ill S. Ct. at 2719 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 2720 (Steven, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 2719-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A. THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CONSTITUTION
DOES NOT REQUIRE INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCING IN NON-
CAPITAL CASES
In Harmelin, a majority of the Court' 3 6 correctly concluded that
the Eighth Amendment does not require a consideration of mitigat-
ing factors in noncapital cases. 13 7 The Supreme Court has held that
imposition of a capital sentence without an individualized determi-
nation of the appropriateness of the punishment constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 138 Harme-
lin relied on this death penalty jurisprudence and argued that the
Eighth Amendment required the Michigan courts to consider aggra-
vating and mitigating factors before imposing a sentence of life in
prison without possibility of parole.13 9 Harmelin contended that life
imprisonment without possibility of parole is the equivalent of a
death sentence. 140
First, the Constitution does not require individualized sentenc-
ing in non-capital cases. 141 Supreme Court decisions have also con-
sistently held that no requirement of individualized sentencing
exists in non-capital cases because of the difference between death
and other penalties. 142 The death penalty is unique in its complete
irrevocability and rejection of rehabilitation. 143 A variety of alterna-
tive techniques exist to modify an initial sentence of life in prison
without possibility of parole. The possibilities of retroactive legisla-
tive reduction and executive clemency clearly exist in noncapital
sentences of life in prison without possibility of parole and not in
capital cases. 144
136 Justice Scalia delivered this portion of the opinion and Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64.
137 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702.
138 Id. at 2701 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (see supra note
58); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (see supra note 58); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 105 (1982) (see supra note 18); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (see supra
note 58).
139 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 21.
140 Id.
141 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-03 (1978). See supra note 58 for an explana-
tion of Lockelt.
142 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104





B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CONTAINS A PROPORTIONALITY
REQUIREMENT
Justice Scalia argued that Solem should be overruled because the
decision was based on an Eighth Amendment proportionality guar-
antee. 145 Justice Scalia believes the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality requirement. 146 Justice Scalia's argument is con-
trary to Supreme Court precedent, and therefore, Justice Scalia
should have recognized an Eighth Amendment proportionality re-
quirement on the basis of stare decisis.
Justice Scalia's argument that the Eighth Amendment contains
no proportionality requirement clearly contradicts Supreme Court
precedent. While stare decisis does not completely bind the Court's
decisions, justices need to respect the development of the law. The
concurrence correctly concluded that stare decisis required adher-
ence to the narrow proportionality requirement recognized in the
Court's prior decisions.
In United States v. Weems, 14 7 the Supreme Court first articulated
the idea that the Eighth Amendment required a penalty to be pro-
portionate to the crime. The Weems case involved a unique punish-
ment. Weems was convicted of falsifying a public and official
document1 48 and under Philippine law, sentenced to the penalty of
cadena temporal. Cadena temporal consisted of fifteen years of incarcer-
ation which included "hard and painful labor" with chains fastened
to the wrists and ankles at all times. Accessory penalties were also
imposed which included permanent disqualification from holding
any position of public trust, government surveillance for life, depri-
vation of the rights of parental authority, guardianship of person or
property.1 49 The Supreme Court explicitly recognized proportion-
ality as a requirement of the Eighth Amendment and struck down
the punishment. 50
The most extensive application of the proportionality require-
ment acknowledged in Weems has occurred in death penalty cases.
In Coker v. Georgia, the Court held a death sentence for the crime of
rape unconstitutionally disproportionate and therefore, cruel and
unusual.' 51 The Court recognized that the death penalty is unique
145 Id. at 2686.
146 Id.
147 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
148 Id. at 363-64.
149 Id. at 364-65.
150 Id. at 367. "[I]t is a precept ofjustice that punishment for crime should be gradu-
ated and proportioned to offense." Id.
151 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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in its total irrevocability but did not specifically address whether a
proportionality requirement applied to terms of imprisonment. 152
In Enmund v. Florida 153, the Court again recognized the Eighth
Amendment as requiring proportionality in sentencing. The En-
mund Court held the death sentence disproportionate for felony
murder, where the defendant did not commit the murder and did
not intend to take a life.' 54
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court refused to invalidate a
sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole for convic-
tion of a third felony under a Texas recidivist statute.155 However,
the majority recognized a proportionality requirement in the Eighth
Amendment in capital and noncapital cases.' 56 In Hutto v. Davis, the
Court held a proportionality review inapplicable to a forty year
prison sentence for the possession with intent to distribute of nine
ounces of marihuana.157 The Supreme Court recognized the possi-
bility of a proportionality review in a situation where a legislature
made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment. 58
The Hutto Court also stated that the Rummel decision stands for the
proposition that federal courts "should be reluctant to review legis-
latively mandated terms of imprisonment .. ". -159 Federal courts
should be reluctant to review legislative terms of imprisonment, but
the Court did not state that a proportionality analysis is inapplicable
in noncapital cases.
In Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court's most recent analysis of
the Eighth Amendment and proportionality prior to Harmelin v.
Michigan, the Court held that imposition of a sentence of life impris-
onment without possibility of parole for conviction of seven succes-
sive felonies violated the Eighth Amendment. r o The sentence of
life imprisonment with possibility of parole was "significantly dis-
proportionate" to the crime of recidivism. 16' The Court held that
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishments forbids sentences that are disproportionate to the crime
152 Id. at 598.
153 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
154 Id. at 787, 801.
155 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980).
156 Id. at 271-74. The Court stated that the Eighth Amendment's proportionality re-
quirement would come into play if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punish-
able by life imprisonment. Id. at 274 n.ll.
157 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-75 (1982).
158 Id. at 374 n.3.
159 Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)).




committed. 162 The Solem dissent disagreed with the majority's pro-
portionality analysis of Solem's facts, but the dissent did admit that in
extreme, extraordinary cases it might be permissible for a court to
decide if a term of imprisonment is grossly disproportionate to the
crime. 163
Thus, Justice Scalia's assertion that the Eighth Amendment
does not contain a proportionality guarantee is inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent which recognizes an Eighth Amendment
proportionality guarantee. Consequently, a majority of the Harmelin
Court correctly continued to recognize the proportionality guaran-
tee engraved in judicial interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
C. IN APPLYING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S PROPORTIONALITY
REQUIREMENT, REVIEWING COURTS SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE
TO LEGISLATURES
The concurrence correctly concluded that the Eighth Amend-
ment's proportionality requirement must be narrow to avoid inter-
ference with the deference courts owe legislatures. 164 However,
Justice Kennedy incorrectly argued that one factor would be suffi-
cient to determine the constitutionality of a punishment.165 Instead,
a reviewing court should consider all three Solem factors: 1) the grav-
ity of the offense compared to severity of the penalty, 2) the penal-
ties imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and 3) the
penalties imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense. 166 An
additional factor of reviewing local conditions and the legislative
goals sought to be achieved by the punishment should be consid-
ered. A reviewing court should consider all four factors, and no sin-
gle factor should be dispositive.
Reviewing courts should defer to legislative judgment when
considering the proportionality of a punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. State legislatures are responsible for determining the-
ories of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution as objectives to
criminal punishment in their jurisdictions. Supreme Court prece-
dent recognizes the substantial deference that should be given to a
162 Id. at 284-90.
163 Id. at 311 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger recognized that it might be appro-
priate for a court to decide whether a sentence is proportional in the hypothetical case of
life imprisonment for overtime parking. Burger stated that the cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause "might apply to those rare cases where reasonable men cannot differ as
to the inappropriateness of punishment." Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 Id. at 2707.
166 Solem, 436 U.S. at 290-91.
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punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature.1 67
"[T]he independence of thejudiciary is jeopardized when courts be-
come embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary re-
sponsibility in chosing between competing political, economic, and
social pressures." 168 Legislatures are better equipped than courts
to balance penal goals with public views and then decide which
sentences are appropriate for different crimes.' 69 Since the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality requirement is narrow, there should
be few successful challenges to punishments outside of capital
cases.
170
Justice Kennedy's concurrence inappropriately modified the So-
Lem three factor test. The concurrence misinterpreted the language
of Solem and the meaning of the Solem opinion. In Solem, the
Supreme Court utilized a three part test 171 to hold a life sentence
without possibility of parole for conviction of a seventh felony under
a South Dakota recidivist statute unconstitutional.1 72 The Solem
Court stated that "no single criterion can identify when a sentence is
so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment."'173 The Harmelin concurrence argued, however, that one fac-
tor may be sufficient to determine the proportionality or
constitutionality of a punishment. 174
The Harmelin concurrence held that a reviewing court should
make an initial comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed. If an initial comparison creates an inference of gross dis-
proportionality, then a court may appropriately conduct an intra-
and inter-jurisdictional analysis.17 5 If a comparison of the crime and
167 Id. at 290 ("reviewing courts ... should grant substantial deference to the broad
authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of pun-
ishments for crimes"); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 262, 274 (1980) (courts should be
reluctant to "review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment"); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910) ("The function of the legislature is primary, its exer-
cises fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with
lightly, nor by any judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety").
168 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 525 (1951)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance ofjudgment).
169 Solem, 463 U.S. at 314 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
170 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
171 The Solem Court's three factor test to determine the proportionality of a sentence
under the Eighth Amendment included: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
172 Id. at 303.
173 Id. at 291 n.17.
174 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the sentence does not lead to an inference of gross disproportional-
ity, an intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis need not be
performed. 176
The concurrence's assertion that the Solem second and third fac-
tors are not needed if an initial determination of proportionality is
found contradicts the meaning of the Solem opinion. In Solem, the
Court stated that "it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction," and that "courts
may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions."' 177 The concurrence ar-
gued that by using the word "may" the Court did not mandatorily
require that these factors be utilized in proportionality analyses.
The concurrence puts unwarranted weight on the word "may"
to justify its modification of the Solem test. The Solem Court stated
that a proportionality analysis should be guided by objective factors
which have been recognized in prior Supreme Court cases. 178 Fur-
ther, the Solem Court stated that no one factor should be dispositive
in determining disproportionality.179 By using the word "may," the
Solem Court merely recognized that in individual cases certain fac-
tors are more helpful or useful in determining the constitutionality
of a given punishment. The Solem Court never suggested the adop-
tion of a bright line standard in which only the first So/em factor
could determine the constitutionality of a given punishment.
The dissent, on the other hand, correctly argued that the Solem
second and third factors are important to any analysis of a given
punishment's proportionality.1 0 Numerous Supreme Court cases
have used the Solem second and third factors to determine the pro-
portionality of a punishment. For example, the Weems Court consid-
ered the less severe punishments for more severe crimes in the
Philippine criminal code.' 8 ' The Weems Court also noted that the
punishment of cadena temporal was different from any American pun-
ishment.'8 2 In Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court compared the
Georgia punishment of death for the crime of raping an adult wo-
man to other states' penalties for rape. 18 3 Finally, in Trop v. Dules,
the Court reviewed international law before concluding that the
punishment of loss of citizenship for wartime desertion violated the
176 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
178 Id. at 290.
179 Id. at 291 n.17.
180 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2715 (White, J., dissenting).
181 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910).
182 Id. at 377.
183 Goker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977).
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Eighth Amendment. 1 84
When reviewing courts utilize the Solem third factor to compare
the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions, they should always consider the nature of our federal
system. Our federalist system invites states to adopt their own theo-
ries of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Each state pos-
sesses the independent power to express public interests through
criminal laws.' 85 Besides different theories and philosophies on
criminal law, each state has different local conditions and problems
which influence the length of its prison terms for given crimes.18 6
Therefore, under our federalist system, one state will often treat
similarly situated criminals more severely than other states.' 8 7 Re-
viewing courts must remember that because a state possesses the
most severe punishment for a certain crime does not in itself
demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
A state with the most severe punishment also may be consid-
ered the most progressive. One may argue that although the Michi-
gan statute imposes the most severe penalty for possession of a
controlled substance of the quantity involved Harmelin's case, the
Michigan statute is the most progressive.'88 The Michigan statute
provides graduated penalties depending upon the amount pos-
sessed. Punishments range from probation for possession of a small
amount to life in prison without possibility of parole for possession
of an amount of 650 grams or more.18 9 Most other jurisdictions
provide one penalty for all offenders. 190
A proportionality analysis should also include a fourth factor
which considers local conditions, the legislative goals sought to be
achieved be imposing a certain punishment, 19 1 and whether these
goals are rationally related to the punishment imposed for a certain
crime. If a state's sentencing scheme or punishment for a given
crime is rationally related to legitimate state goals, then this could
contribute to the punishment's constitutionality.
184 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1985) (plurality opinion). "The civilized nations
of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punish-
ment for crime." Id.
185 Harmelin v. Michigan 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2704 (1991). (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991)).
186 Id. at 2704 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
187 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281).
188 Brief for Respondent at 11, Harmelin v. Michigan, I IIS. Ct. 2680 (1991) (No. 89-
7272) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
189 Id. at 11-12.
190 Id. at 12.
191 Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1973).
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First, courts must consider relevant local circumstances. The
local prevalence of a certain criminal problem is a plausible justifica-
tion for a state creating more severe penalties for certain crimes
than other states.192 For example, the Solem dissent recognized that
horse thievery in Texas might be punished differently and more se-
verely than stealing a horse in Rhode Island.193 Similarly, drug traf-
ficking poses severe problems for highly urban states like New York
which are fighting large scale drug operations in their cities.
After determining the legislative goals sought to be achieved by
the punishment, courts should analyze whether the state legislative
goals are rationally related to the punishment. "If there is a signifi-
cantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for
which the punishment is inflicted,"' 194 then this would also contrib-
ute to a conclusion of disproportionality. t95 Courts should ask
whether the state's punishment is rationally related to the legitimate
legislative purpose. For example, a state could punish overtime
parking with life imprisonment. This punishment would serve the
purpose of deterring vehicular lawlessness. However, the punish-
ment is not rationally related to the state goal because significantly
less severe punishments could serve the same goal. In sum, if a
punishment fails to contribute to legitimate state goals and there-
fore, inflicts unnecessary pain, this fact points to the unconstitution-
ality of the punishment.
Carmona v. Ward demonstrates an approach which reviewing
courts could follow to ensure consideration of local conditions and
policies. 196 In Carmona, the plaintiffs sought a federal writ of habeas
corpus arguing that their mandatory life sentences for convictions of
possessing one ounce of cocaine and a "street sale" of .00445 ounce
of cocaine violated the Eighth Amendment. 9 7 The Second Circuit
held constitutional the mandatory life sentences for the minor drug
192 Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1144
(1979).
193 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 309 (1983) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
194 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972).
195 In Gregg, the Court stated that an excessive punishment involves "the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). In Coker,
the Supreme Court stated that an excessive and unconstitutional punishment "makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering ...... Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
196 See People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950
(1975) for a similar approach in reviewing punishments under the same New York
statute.
197 Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 406, 417 (2nd Cir. 1978).
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offenses.' 98 The court took into account the punishments for other
serious crimes in New York and the punishments in other jurisdic-
tions fof the same crime. 199
The Carmona court also considered the local situation in New
York and the legislature's goals.200 The court stated that the pur-
pose of the New York drug law was both isolation of offenders and
deterrence. 20 1 In 1967, the governor of New York sponsored a stat-
ute which emphasized treatment of drug addicts and not imprison-
ment.20 2 However, most of those treated were not cured but
became recidivists. 20 3 The court noted that more than half of all the
addicts in the nation resided in New York City.204 The court stated
that New York's determination that drug trafficking posed an imme-
diate enough threat to pass the most severe punishment in the na-
tion 20 5 could not be characterized as "arbitrary or irrational."20 6
Finally, the court stated, "If the punishment must fit the crime, the
legislature must look at the crime as found in its own borders and
the action of the states with drug problems of lesser magnitude are
of little relevance." 20 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The Harmelin Court addressed the issue of whether the Eighth
Amendment contains a proportionality requirement and held that a
mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for
a conviction of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, without
any consideration of mitigating factors, did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. The concurrence correctly concluded that the Eighth
Amendment forbids not only certain methods and modes of punish-
ment but also punishments that are disproportionate to the crimes
committed. A narrow proportionality guarantee serves two pur-
poses. First, the Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement
serves as a check on legislatures unconstitutionally infringing on in-
dividual rights. Second, a narrow proportionality guarantee pre-
198 Id. at 417.
199 Id. at 414-15.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 414.
202 Id. at 413.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 415.
205 Id. at 414.
206 Id. at 415. The court distinguished this case from the punishment of death for the
crime of rape in Coker v. Georgia. Georgia's punishment of death was unique among




978 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 82
serves legislatures' broad power to fashion punishments which
reflect their local conditions and theories of deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, and retribution. In addition to the three Solem factors,'propor-
tionality reviews should include a rational basis test. Courts should
consider local conditions when determining whether state goals are
legitimate and rationally related to a given punishment.
MARGARET R. GIBBS
